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Abstract
Hybrid systems have emerged as an appropriate formalism to model embedded systems as they capture
the theme of continuous dynamics with discrete control. Under this paradigm, distributed embedded
systems can be modeled as a network of communicating hybrid automata. Several techniques for code
generation from these models have also been proposed and commercially implemented. Providing formal
guarantees of the generated code with respect to the model, however, has turned out to be a hard
problem. While the model is set in continuous time with concurrent execution and instantaneous
switching, the code running on an inherently discrete platform, can be affected by the sampling interval,
round-off errors, and communication delays between the sensor, controller, and actuators. Consequently,
semantic differences between the model and its code can arise with potentially different system behavior.
This paper proposes a criterion for faithful implementation of the hybrid-systems model with a focus on
its switching semantics. We discuss different techniques to ensure a faithful implementation of the
model, and test the feasibility of our concepts by implementing a model heater system. In this heater
case study, we successfully eliminate all fault transitions and, thereby, generate code with correct
behavior complying with the specification.
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Abstract—Hybrid systems have emerged as an appropriate formalism to model embedded systems as they capture the theme of
continuous dynamics with discrete control. Under this paradigm, distributed embedded systems can be modeled as a network of
communicating hybrid automata. Several techniques for code generation from these models have also been proposed and
commercially implemented. Providing formal guarantees of the generated code with respect to the model, however, has turned out to
be a hard problem. While the model is set in continuous time with concurrent execution and instantaneous switching, the code running
on an inherently discrete platform, can be affected by the sampling interval, round-off errors, and communication delays between the
sensor, controller, and actuators. Consequently, semantic differences between the model and its code can arise with potentially
different system behavior. This paper proposes a criterion for faithful implementation of the hybrid-systems model with a focus on its
switching semantics. We discuss different techniques to ensure a faithful implementation of the model, and test the feasibility of our
concepts by implementing a model heater system. In this heater case study, we successfully eliminate all fault transitions and, thereby,
generate code with correct behavior complying with the specification.
Index Terms—Formal languages, software engineering.
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INTRODUCTION

M

real-time embedded systems are complex,
distributed, feature-rich applications. For example, a
car incorporates 30 to 60 microcontroller units [1], [2] and
desired functionality includes automatic parking, automatic
car coordination, and automatic collision avoidance. The
development of such functionality is time consuming and
difficult, since faults in the temporal or value domain may
lead to system failures, which in turn can lead to catastrophes
with possibly human losses. Model-based development of
real-time embedded systems promises to simplify and
accelerate the implementation process. This is because of
its promises such as formal guarantees and code generation.
Several mathematical models such as Timed Automata [3],
Hybrid Systems [4], and State charts [5] have been successfully applied to such systems.
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1.1 Modeling with Hybrid Systems
Hybrid systems are an appropriate modeling paradigm for
embedded control software, because it can be used to specify
continuous change of the system state as well as discrete
transition of states [6], [7].
Traditionally, control theory and related fields have
addressed the problem of designing robust control laws to
ensure optimal performance of processes with continuous
dynamics. While this is important, control-theory-based
approach does not consider the problem of implementing
the control laws in software and associated problems
involving concurrency and communication. The computer
science perspective, on the other hand, is that of a discrete
world, largely ignoring the physics of the environment
(continuous variables) the embedded system is dealing with
and consequently, unable to provide safety and performance guarantees of the system. Hybrid-systems approach
combines aspects of these two approaches and is, therefore,
better at modeling embedded systems.
Benefits of hybrid-systems modeling are significantly
enhanced, if code is generated automatically from the
model such that the correspondence between the model and
the code is precisely understood. Code generation from
hybrid-systems models eventually involves assigning a rate
by which the continuous state evolves. In such a discretized
hybrid-systems model, the state changes in a discrete
manner according to the rate typically assigned by the
model designer. Further, the concurrency of the model is
broken in distributed implementations where delays in
updates can result in semantic differences. Realizing a
faithful implementation of the model, therefore, involves
addressing all of these issues.
Published by the IEEE Computer Society
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.

Fig. 1. A system with two agents.

Consider the following vehicle coordination problem
(adapted from MoBIES Vehicle-Vehicle Automotive OEP
Problem [8]) as an example of a hybrid-systems model:
Example 1 (Vehicle Coordination). Consider the example of
vehicle coordination where there are two vehicles. The
first vehicle is a leader. It follows the dynamics depicted
as agent A1 in Fig. 1. x1 denotes the distance of leader from
the baseline, v1 , its velocity. The dynamics of the leader
are determined by the control function u. The second
vehicle trails the leader and maintains a safe distance
from it as described in the figure by agent A2 . Its distance
from the baseline is given by x2 and velocity by v2 . If it is
closer than dmin from the leader, it will slow down with a
rate v_2 ¼ 1 and if it is farther than dmax , it will accelerate
with a rate v_2 ¼ 1. The invariant in state q1 is x1  x2 2
½dmin ; dmax þ , in q2 is x1  x2  dmin  , and in q3 is
x1  x2  dmax þ , where  is the tolerance parameter.

1.2 Problem Statement and Contributions
One problem of code generation for hybrid systems is that
the generated code must faithfully implement the hybridsystems model. This means that transitions in the software
state machine should occur according to the hybridsystems model. Thus, transitions that only occur in the
software but not in the model (i.e., faulty transitions) or
transitions that only occur in the model but not in the
software (i.e., missed transitions) are undesired and should
be prevented. This work integrates previous efforts in
reliable and faithful code generation [4], [9], [10], [11] by
providing a uniform representation with better elucidation
of all the introduced concepts, including code snippets,
and an example case study.
We introduce a technique called instrumentation of
guards to prevent faulty mode transitions but at the same
introduce no missed transitions. Instrumentation shrinks
the guard so that the transition is made safe (not faulty but
not missed). It is related to the hysteresis technique used in
many control systems. Like hysteresis, it too uses a higher
threshold when switching from below and a lower threshold when switching from above, so that transitions are not
made erroneously. However, instrumentation does not
prevent oscillations in the controller. It is definitely possible
that an instrumented system exhibits oscillations. For such
systems, it may become essential to use hysteresis in
addition to instrumentation.

We introduce the problem of reliable code generation with respect to switching discrepancies (Sections 2.1-2.3).
We present techniques to eliminate the faulty
transitions in code (Section 3.1).
We develop a sufficient condition to check for
missed transitions (Section 3.2).
We illustrate the introduced techniques on an
example heater system model (Section 4).

1.3 Introduction to CHARON
This section introduces CHARON [12], a tool for modular
specification of interacting hybrid systems based on the
notions of agent and mode. For hierarchical description of
the system architecture, CHARON provides the operations
of instantiation, hiding, and parallel composition on agents,
which can be used to build a complex agent from other
agents. The discrete and continuous behaviors of an agent
are described using modes. For hierarchical description of
the behavior of an agent, CHARON supports the operations
of instantiation and nesting of modes. Furthermore, features
such as weak preemption, history retention, and externally
defined Java functions facilitate the description of complex
discrete behavior. Continuous behavior can be specified
using differential as well as algebraic equations and
invariants restricting the flow spaces, all of which can be
declared at various levels of the hierarchy. The modular
structure of the language is not merely syntactic, but also
reflected in the semantics so that it can be exploited during
analysis. The key features of CHARON include:
Architectural hierarchy. The building block for describing the system architecture is an agent that communicates
with its environment via shared variables and also communication channels. The language supports the operations of
composition of agents for concurrency, hiding of variables
for information encapsulation, and instantiation of agents
for reuse.
Behavioral hierarchy. The building block for describing
a flow of control inside an atomic agent is a mode. A mode
is basically a hierarchical state machine, that is, a mode can
have submodes and transitions connecting them. Variables
can be declared locally inside any mode with standard
scoping rules for visibility. Modes can be connected to each
other through well-defined entry and exit points. The
instantiation of modes so that the same mode definition can
be reused in multiple contexts. Finally, to support exceptions, the language allows group transitions from default
exit points that are applicable to all enclosing modes and to
support history retention, the language allows default entry
transitions that restore the local state within a mode from
the most recent exit.
Discrete and continuous variable updates. Discrete
updates are specified by guarded actions labeling transitions connecting the modes. Such updates correspond to
mode switching, and are allowed to modify variables
through assignment statements. Variables in CHARON can
be declared as type analog, and they flow continuously
during the continuous updates that model passage of time.
The evolution of analog variables can be constrained in

ANAND ET AL.: GENERATING RELIABLE CODE FROM HYBRID-SYSTEMS MODELS

three ways: differential equations (e.g., by equations such as
x_ ¼ fðx; uÞ), algebraic equations (e.g., by equations such as
y ¼ gðx; uÞ), and invariants (e.g., x  y < c) which limit the
allowed durations of flows. Such constraints can be
declared at different levels of the mode hierarchy.
Example 2. The following code snippet shows how CHARON
model of the obstacle avoidance controller from Example 1. The controller has three locations labeled ConstantVel, Accel, and Decel. The two continuous variables
are velocity (v) and position (x). The mode TopMode
captures the entire model. This mode is composed of the
three submodes. The code for one such submode,
ConstantVel, is also given below. The rate of change of
position and velocity are captured by specifying the
differential equation associated with it (x_ ¼ v, and v_ ¼ 0).
The guard G1 of Fig. 1 is encoded as the condition SuðxÞ.
Listing 1. CHARON code snippet for the vehicle controller
of Example 1.
mode TopMode (real x1, real v1){
write analog x,v;
mode q1 ¼ ConstantVel();
mode q2 ¼ AccelðÞ;
mode q3 ¼ Decel();
trans from default to q1 when true
do{x ¼ x1; v ¼ v1;}
trans from q1 to q2 when (SuðxÞ ¼ true) do {}
trans from q2 to q1 when (SuðxÞ ¼ false) do {}
...
}
mode ConstantVel()
{
write analog real x; v;
diff {dðxÞ ¼¼ v; dðvÞ ¼¼ 0}
invSuðxÞ ¼ true
}

1.4 Related Work
Model-based automatic code generation has been an
extensive research initiative in recent years and already
successfully applied in industry [13]. Commercial modeling
tools such as RationalRose [14], TargetLink [15], and
SIMULINK [16] also support code generation and address
the effect of errors in the code. However, their concerns are
largely limited to numerical errors occurring each step
during simulation, and the effect of such errors on discrete
behavior is not addressed rigorously. Synchronous languages for reactive systems, such as STATECHARTS [5],
ESTEREL [17], and LUSTRE [18], [19] also support code
generation. However, they do not explicitly support
continuous time modeling. SHIFT [20] is a language for
hybrid automata that also supports code generation, but it
concentrates on dynamic networks.
Model-based development of embedded systems is also
promoted by other projects with orthogonal concerns:
Ptolemy supports integration of heterogeneous models of
computation [21] and GME supports metamodeling for
development of domain-specific modeling languages [22].
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Girard et al. [23] also consider hybrid-systems modeling of
embedded applications; however, their focus is on verification of safety properties and not code generation. There also
exist other efforts toward model-driven development of
embedded software from models other than hybrid systems
[24]. In a closely related work, Stauner [25] discusses at
length, the discrete refinement of hybrid automata, considering implementation effects such as sampling errors and its
impact on verification.

2

TECHNIQUES FOR GENERATING RELIABLE CODE

2.1 Model and Overview
Formally, a hybrid model consists of a real vector x denoting
the continuous state, a finite set of discrete states P that
associates x with a differential equation x_ ¼ fp ðxÞ, for each
p 2 P , and a set of transitions E  P  P . The continuous
state x evolves according to the differential equation x_ ¼
fp ðxÞ when the current discrete state is p. When the current
discrete state is changed from p to p0 , x is optionally reset to
a new value Rðx; p; p0 Þ defined by a map R : IRn  P 
P ! IRn , and continues evolution in accordance with a new
differential equation x_ ¼ fp0 ðxÞ associated with p0 . To control
the discrete behavior, discrete transitions can be guarded by
predicates over x. That is, a set Gððp; p0 ÞÞ  IRn for each
ðp; p0 Þ 2 E specifies the necessary condition on the continuous state that the transition ðp; p0 Þ can be taken. Note that a
discrete transition is not necessarily taken immediately even
if the guard is true. To enforce a transition, an invariant set
IðpÞ  IRn is associated for each p 2 P to specify the
condition that the discrete state can stay in p (that is, the
condition that x will follow x_ ¼ fp ðxÞ). An outgoing transition should be taken before the continuous state goes out of
the invariant set.
This framework assumes that there is a network of
hybrid automata (called agents) communicating via a set of
shared variables. A single agent is denoted by A ¼ ðA; SV Þ
where A is the hybrid model of the agent, and SV is the set
of shared variables. A system of communicating hybrid
agents is represented by the tuple C ¼ hðA; SV Þ1 ; . . . ;
ðA; SV Þn i. Every s 2 SV is assumed to be updated by a
unique agent, and that it follows rectangular dynamics, i.e.,
s_ 2 ½L1 ; L2 , L1 , L2 2 Q
Q n f0g. Such rectangular automata
are of practical significance, as hybrid systems with very
general dynamics can be locally approximated arbitrarily
closely using rectangular dynamics [26]. Further, the guard
and invariants are assumed to be conjunction of rectangular
V
sets on variables (e.g., g ¼ i xi 2 ½lxi ; uxi ). The guards are
also assumed to be such that at most one of them is enabled
at a time. Implementation of the continuous model involves
assigning a suitable sampling rate to every agent.
Definition 1 (Discrete Communicating Hybrid Automata
(DCHA)). Given a system of communicating hybrid agents
C, and a relative period of update of variables ,  2 ZZþ , the
discretized system of communicating agents (DCHA) is
given by D ¼ hðA; SV ; Þ1 ; . . . ; ðA; SV ; Þn i, such that
gcdð1 ; . . . ; n Þ ¼ 1.
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DCHA is the model of code that is implemented on actual
platforms. Therefore, the guarantees of execution are provided with reference to this model. In the definition of DCHA
(Definition 1), we have restricted the period of updates of
different agents to be relatively prime. This restriction is not
necessary, but has been used to keep the model of automaton
distinct from its implementation. In fact, we associate this
period of update for an agent with an absolute time interval of
update in the code that implements the model.
For a rigorous definition of system of communicating
agents and their semantics, the reader is referred to [9].
When the discretized model is mapped to a real-time task in
the code-generation environment, each agent is assigned a
period of execution.
Definition 2 (Code). The code implementing a DCHA D is given
by the tuple K ¼ hðA; SV ; clk; h; Þ0 ; . . . ; ðA; SV clk; h; Þn i,
where clk 2 IRþ represents the physical time,  represents the
local copy of the shared variables, hi ð¼ ki Þ is the actual period
of evaluation, which is a multiple of the relative period i .
The definition of platform consists of a mapping
between the model and the node that executes the code
corresponding to that model, the communication delay
involved, and a quantum of execution supported at each
node. The quantum is defined by how often a computation
can be performed on any node.
Definition 3 (Platform). A platform P is defined as the tuple
hN ; M; ; i, where N is a system of nodes, M : A ! N is a
function that maps an agent to a node on which it is to be
executed,  is a map that takes agents as input and returns the
upper bound on communication delay between the two agents
in A,1 and  2 IRþ is the baseline period, i.e., the quanta of the
period of execution of any agent.

2.2

Code Generation Procedure from
Hybrid-System Models
This section gives a brief overview of the procedure of code
generation from hybrid models. The translation of continuous behavior specified by differential and algebraic
equations is presented first, and then the translation of
discrete actions specified by guarded transitions. Later in
the section, the issue of discrepancy between the model and
the generated code is discussed along with real-time
resource concerns and choice of correctness criteria [4], [9].
A differential equation of the form of x_ ¼ fðxÞ specifies
continuous change of variable x at the rate specified as
the first derivative fðxÞ of x with respect to time (i.e.,
dx=dt ¼ fðxÞ). Continuous change of a variable can be
simulated by stepwise update of the variable based on a
numerical method that computes an approximate value of
the variable after a discrete time step (e.g., Runge-Kutta
method [27]). The simplest numerical method is the one
known as Euler’s method, which projects the value of the
variable at the next time step through linear extrapolation.
For example, a differential equation x_ ¼ 2 is translated into
an assignment statement x :¼ x þ 2  h, where h is the step
size. In fact, no more sophisticated method is necessary if
the right-hand side of the differential equation is a constant.
1. We assume that the communication delay is symmetric between two
agents.

Fig. 2. Different types of transition policies [10].

Once the differential equations are solved, algebraic
equations are evaluated to reflect the change due to
differential equations. The general form of algebraic equations is y ¼ gðxÞ. An algebraic equation can be implemented
by an assignment statement of the same form. That is, an
algebraic equation y ¼ gðxÞ is simply translated into an
assignment of the form y :¼ gðxÞ.
Discrete actions of hybrid automata specify instantaneous
switching of system dynamics and optional reset of variables. Discrete actions are specified by transitions between
positions, where each position defines different dynamics.
The transition has a guard that specifies the necessary
condition for the transition to be taken, and may have
optional assignments to variables that are performed at the
moment when the transition is taken. When a transition is
taken, differential and algebraic equations defined in the
source position become no longer active, and those defined
in the destination position take effect immediately.
The guard in the hybrid-system model enables or disables
a transition, rather than immediately triggering a transition in
hybrid-systems models. This means that enabled transitions
may be taken delayed as long as the invariant is satisfied.
Conceptually, transitions are nondeterministic in the model,
and the implementation determines exactly when a transition
is taken. An obvious policy is an urgent transition policy
where a transition is taken as soon as the guard evaluates true.
An instrumentation [9] transition policy is one that enforces
transitions to be taken some time  after the transition is
enabled, but no later than  before the transition is disabled.
Yet another possibility is to enforce a transition once it is
enabled. Such a policy is called an eager transition policy. In
other words, an eager transition policy implies that an
enabled transition is always taken, whereas the original
hybrid-system model does not mandate this. Note that the
urgent transition policy is an eager transition policy. The
instrumented transition policy is an eager transition policy if
the instrumented guard set is a nonempty set. The different
types of transition policies are illustrated in Fig. 2 for a twodimensional state space. In the example, invariant and guard
sets are rectangular sets. The invariant is the outer rectangle,
followed by the shaded region which is the guard set. The
instrumented guard is the region inside the dashed rectangle
(innermost rectangle). The trajectory of the hybrid system is
shown in bold (x_ ¼ f1 ðxÞ). The various dotted lines from this
trajectory represent the different times at which transition to
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TABLE 1
A Run with Faulty Transition

Fig. 3. Workflow of our framework [10].

a different state can be taken. In the next state, the system
follows the dotted trajectory representing equation x_ ¼ f2 ðxÞ.
This work only considers an eager transition policy.

2.3 Issues in Reliable Code Generation
Typically, the code generator translates a hybrid-systems
model into a set of functions that can be invoked periodically
by the underlying runtime system to simulate the original
model. Intuitively, as the period gets close to zero, the
behavior of the generated code will get close to the model.
However, it is generally not guaranteed that the discrepancy
will be bounded by using a smaller period due to the discrete
nature of hybrid systems. For example, small errors in solving
the differential equations numerically may lead to a discrete
state change that should otherwise not occur, resulting in an
entirely different trace thereafter. Thus, validation of the
generated code against the originating model is essential for
model-based code generation paradigm.
In this work, we propose a framework for automatic
code generation and validation for hybrid-systems models
to distributed execution environment. Our framework
combines and extends previously proposed techniques [9],
[28]. In our framework, the code is generated and validated
against hybrid-systems models in three steps as illustrated
in Fig. 3. First, the model is analyzed whether a transition
that is not possible in the model may occur when it is
translated into code according to the user assigned update
frequency. To prevent such faulty transitions, the model is
instrumented such that transitions are taken conservatively
considering errors due to discreteness of the code. Second,
the instrumented model is analyzed to check whether a
transition may be missed. In this stage, each transition is
analyzed whether it is enabled long enough compared to
the user assigned update frequency. Finally, the instrumented model is fed into the code generator to produce the
code. The workflow described in Fig. 3 reflects a translation
of the model to the code. Conceptually, this translation
progresses from the hybrid-systems model defined in
continuous time to the code that runs in a distributed
discrete environment. At each stage of the code generation
process shown in Fig. 3, there is a successive relaxation of
behavioral semantics. Hence, it is essential to carefully
analyze and identify criteria for a faithful implementation of
the model. This is the principal focus of this paper.
There are a number of issues that need to be addressed to
provide guarantees in the generated code. The focus here is
on preventing switching discrepancies. The continuous
semantics of the model are implemented in the code with
the help of numerical methods which introduce an error
due to discretization in addition to the round-off and
truncation errors on target platforms. These errors along
with the order of scheduling of the reads may cause a
transition to be falsely enabled. If such a faulty transition is

taken, the dynamics of the system may be completely
different from the intended model. The example below
highlights such a possibility.
Example 3 (Faulty Transition). Consider the vehicle coordination system in Example 1. We will describe a
working scenario where the delay in communication of
variables causes the system to make a faulty transition.2
Let us say that the relative period of update for agents A1
and A2 be ð5; 3Þ and the actual periods of updates be 0:1 s
and 0:06 s, respectively. Also, let u ¼ 2, dmin ¼ 0:1, and
dmax ¼ 0:5, and initial positions of vehicles be x01 ¼ 0:3072
and x02 ¼ 0:2, from the baseline, initial velocities v01 ¼ 0,
v02 ¼ 0, ðA1 ; A2 Þ ¼ ðA2 ; A1 Þ ¼ 0:03 s, and the current
states of agents be q0 and q2 .
More formally, let the system of agents be executed on
two nodes N1 and N2 . Then, the agents are given by
ðA1 ; fx1 ; x2 g; clk; 5; fx1 ðA1 Þ; x2 ðA1 ÞgÞ a n d ðA2 ; fx1 ; x2 g;
clk; 3; fx1 ðA2 Þ; x2 ðA2 ÞgÞ while the implementation is given
b y hfN1 ; N2 g; fðA1 ; N1 Þ; ðA2 ; N2 ÞgðððA1 ; A2 Þ; 0:03Þ; ððA2 ;
A1 Þ; 0:03ÞÞ; 0:02i, respectively. In the definition, clk is a
clock representing the physical time of the system. Table 1
shows a potential run of the system. The table shows the
value of variable xi on agent Aj at times 0:06 s, 0:1 s, and
0:12 s. As the value of the variable could be different on
different agents (due to communication delays), we
describe the local values by the notation xi ðAj Þ. In this
run, at time 0.12, the difference between vehicles is
0:3172  0:2072 ¼ 0:11ð>0:1Þ, but the estimated distance
at A2 is 0:3072  0:2072 ¼ 0:0956 < 0:1. Due to this
discrepancy, the agent A2 makes a faulty transition to q3 .
Aside from faulty transitions, implementations of hybridsystem models are also vulnerable to missed transitions.
Insufficient sampling rates, choice of scheduling of reads,
etc., may cause a transition to be missed. Missing some
transitions may cause the system to end up in a erroneous
state. This is illustrated with an example below.
Example 4. Consider the system in Example 1. Consider that
the system model is as specified in Example 3, but with
actual periods of update to be ð0:25 s; 0:15 sÞ. Also, let
dmin ¼ 0:25, dmax ¼ 0:5, and the control parameter u ¼ 0.
x1 ¼ 0:48, v1 ¼ 5, and v2 ¼ 4:5 at t ¼ 0:15, and the current
state of A2 be q2 . Further, let d ¼ x1  x2 and d_ ¼ x_1  x_2 2
½0:45; 0:5. The guard G4 is then the condition d 2 ð0:25;
0:5Þ. On instrumentation, the guard becomes d 2 ð0:25 þ
0:1  0:5; 0:5  0:1  0:5Þ ¼ ð0:3; 0:45Þ as the maximum
skew is 0.1, and L2 ¼ 0:5. A partial run of the system is
shown in Table 2. Although instrumenting the guards
ensures that there are no faulty transitions now, the
transition from q2 to q1 is missed in the run. At
time t ¼ 0:3 s, the agent A2 instead transits to q3 .
2. It must be mentioned that this is merely an illustrative example, and
the values here are for the sake of the example.
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TABLE 2
A Run with Missed Transition

In providing guarantees of faithful implementation, it is
desired to have no faulty or missed transitions [10] from the
point of view of switching, and errors in variables are
bounded from the perspective of dynamics. A schedulingindependent guarantee that the global state of the code be
consistent with that of the model is yet another objective.
The following definition formally captures this idea.
Definition 4 (Faithful Implementation). Let V C be the set
of all variables and x be the maximum bound on the error
of a variable x. Given a trace of states of the code K of
model Dhq0 ; q1 ; . . .i, at physical time stamps hclk0 ; clk1 ; . . .i,
where qi ¼ ðqA1 ; . . . ; qAn Þi , if, 8i,
8x 2 V C; jxD  xK j < x , where xK and xD represent
the value of variable in the code and the model,
respectively.
0
where qK is the state of the
2. 8j : qK ¼ qD or qK ¼ qD
0
code, qD and qD are the projection of the state of the
model onto the code for agent Ai at logical times lti
(corresponding to clki ) and lti þ hj , respectively.
Then, K is said to be a faithful implementation of D. If the code
satisfies condition 1, then it is said to be bounded numerical
error implementation.
1.

Condition 1 states that the error in continuous variables
is bounded. Condition 2 states that the state of the code
of agent Aj at any given time, corresponds to either the
corresponding logical state in the model or corresponds to
the next logical state. This tolerance is given because the
exact time of scheduling is not specified and if the agent has
finished execution for that period, its logical state will
reflect the next logical state. However, this is a rather strong
criteria to enforce in time-delayed systems where the delays
could be different for every agent and even within an agent,
the delay in taking a transition can vary based on the
communication delay with the agent updating the variables
in the guard. For example, in one mode, an agent could
depend on x that arrives 0:0001 s late and in another mode,
it could depend on y that arrives 0:0002 s later. Therefore,
the criteria is relaxed by requiring that code enters the state
of the model no later than the maximum possible delay.
Formally, we can state the following:
Definition 5 (Relative Faithful Implementation). Let V C be
the set of all variables and x be the maximum bound on the
error of a variable x. Given a trace of states of the code K for an
agent Aj , hq0 ; q1 ; . . .i, at physical time stamps hclk0 ; clk1 ; . . .i,
if, 8clk,
1.

8x 2 V C; jxD ðltÞ  xK ðltÞj < x , where xK and xD
represent the value of variable in the code and the
model, respectively, and lt, the logical time in the code.

Fig. 4. An example hybrid-system model and its implementations.
0
0
0
, or 9qK
: qK
¼ qD , where qK is
8j : qK ¼ qD ; qK ¼ qD
0
the state of the code, qD , qD , are the projection of the state
of the model onto the code for agent Ai at logical times lti
0
(corresponding to clki ) and lti þ hj , respectively. qK
is
the state of the code at a time t < lti þ j þ ’ þ hj ,
where l ¼ maxl ði; lÞ and ’ is the maximum skew due
to different rates of updates.
Then, code for Aj is said to be a relative faithful implementation. If 8j, Aj is a relative faithful implementation, then K is a
relative faithful implementation of D.

2.

As in Definition 4, Condition 1 states that the error in
continuous variables is bounded. Condition 2 states that the
state of the code of agent Aj at any given time, corresponds
to either the corresponding logical state in the model or
corresponds to the next logical state (similar to Condition 2
of Definition 4). Further, if the state of the code is not one of
these, then this must be due to the communication delay
and skew, so the state of the model is entered within
time t < lti þ j þ ’ þ hj . This is because, all the updates to
variables would reach an agent in within time lti þ j þ ’.
At that point, if the agent has not yet been scheduled for the
cycle, it will take the transition during that cycle. If it has
already been scheduled, then the transition will be taken in
the next cycle.
Example 5. Consider the transitions of a hybrid-system
model and two implementations as described in Fig. 4.
The run records transitions between four states labeled
q0 , q1 , q2 , and q3 . The run of the model is shown in Fig. 4a.
The dashed vertical line represents the sampling periods,
i.e., times at which the discrete implementation updates
the variables and states. Implementation in Fig. 4b is a
faithful implementation, as the state of the implementation match those of the model at the sampling periods.
Assuming the maximum skew and communication delay
is half the sampling period, Fig. 4c is a relative faithful
implementation of the model, as the transitions in the
implementation are taken at the next sampling period
where the updated values of variables are available.

ANAND ET AL.: GENERATING RELIABLE CODE FROM HYBRID-SYSTEMS MODELS

3

ADDRESSING THE ISSUES IN RELIABLE CODE
GENERATION

Note that even if we use the relaxed notion of correctness,
validation of correct implementation is still nontrivial. The
reasons include the following:
Only a small class of differential equations can be
solved exactly. For most cases, numerical methods
yield an approximate solution. Hence, obtaining
numerical bounds on error is often not possible.
Errors due to numerical integration of differential
equations are, thus, generally analyzed and represented by the O notation, and a constant error bound
can be rarely analyzed, if not impossible. The problem
is even more complex when we consider switching of
differential equations and the precision of the floatingpoint unit.
. A transition that must be taken to satisfy the invariant
may be missed because the transition condition is not
evaluated frequently enough.
We believe that a general solution that addresses all the
problems in the general hybrid systems is unlikely to exist,
because a general solution for a constant error bound of
numerical integration is not known. However, for some
limited class of hybrid systems (e.g., linear hybrid systems),
a constant error bound can be easily obtained. We have
addressed some issues related to sampling in previous
work (see [29]), but have not integrated all of them into this
framework.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on techniques
to identify and address switching related issues in reliable
code generation of hybrid-system models.
.

3.1 Preventing Faulty Transitions
Faulty transition is a transition that is taken in the code but
is not possible in the model. It occurs either because the
transition was taken on the basis of an older value of the
variable or because of numerical errors in the variables.
Definition 6 (Faulty Transition). Let p0 ; . . . pn be a sequence of
positions in the trace of the code. ðpn1 ; pn Þ is a faulty
transition if p0 ; p1 ; . . . ; pn1 is a valid sequence of positions in
the model, but p0 ; p1 ; . . . ; pn is not.
Static instrumentation was introduced by Hur et al. [9] as
an approach to prevent faulty transitions. The idea there
was to instrument the guards and the invariants with
maximum possible error in variables and switch conservatively. Once the guards and the invariants have been
instrumented, the code generated from D can be assured
of no faulty transitions. Though this approach has the
advantage that guarantees can be given statically, there is a
trade-off associated with this conservative switching. Since
the guard and invariant sets are shrunk, the probability of
not taking a transition increases. Yet another disadvantage
is that it is not always possible to determine this error bound
beforehand as with most differential equations, it is only
possible to get a local estimate of error which is only
available at runtime. Therefore, in this work, we introduce a
technique to dynamically instrument the guards and
invariants based on the runtime estimates of errors. The
main advantage of this approach, as opposed to static
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instrumentation, is that it shrinks the guard and invariant
sets by a smaller amount, and thereby reducing the risk of
missed transitions.
Errors in variables could be due to numerical errors in
solving the differential equations, or are timing-induced due
to the different rates of execution of the agents. The
numerical errors introduced during the solution of differential equations are of the two types: the truncation error
due to truncations in Taylor series expansions and the
round-off error due to a finite precision of real numbers in
the computer. Both the truncation error and the round-off
errors are accumulated from during the integration process
and can be quite dominant sources of numerical error as the
number of integration steps increases. Determining the error
bounds for these errors accurately is hard. While computing
the exact or close enough bounds is difficult and tricky,
computing approximate error estimates, at least within an
order of magnitude is possible. For ordinary differential
equations, classical methods like Runge-Kutta method [27]
can be used to compute the order of error bound given the
step size of simulation. This is a harder proposition for a
system of differential and algebraic equations (see [30] for
some details). For the purposes of instrumenting the guards,
a technique for bounding the numerical errors has been
presented by Hur et al. [31]. In this work, we assume that
reliable bounds for numerical errors have been computed a
priori.
As mentioned above, the other source of error in
variables is timing-induced, i.e., due to the different rates
of execution of the agents. This can be estimated from the
maximum delay in communication between the agents. The
communication delay itself is obtained by monitoring and
the maximum skew, ’ (from Definition 5).
Once we have computed the bounds on numerical
errors, we can define guard and invariant set instrumentation as follows:
Definition 7 (Instrumentation). Let p be a state of agent Aj
with EAj ðpÞ being the set of discrete transitions, and the
interval under consideration be ½lt; lt þ .
V If the guard set
g 2 GAj ðeÞ, e 2 EAjVis of the form, g ¼ i xi 2 ½lxi ; uxi , the
invariant IAj ðpÞ ¼ i xi 2 ½l0xi ; u0xi , ’ and  compute the
skew and delay between the agents, then, the instrumented
guards and invariant are given by,
^


ginst ¼
xi 2 lxi þ p;xi þ L2xi xi ; uxi  p;xi  L2xi xi
ð1Þ
i

I inst ¼

^


xi 2 l0xi þ p;xi þ L2xi

0
x i ; ux i

 p;xi  L2xi

xi



ð2Þ

i

where xi ¼ ’ðAi ; Aj Þ þ ðAi ; Aj Þ, xi is updated by agent Ai ,
with x_i 2 ½L1xi ; L2xi , and p;xi is the round-off and truncation
error in xi in the state p.
Example 6. Consider the system in Example 3 in the time
interval [0, 1]. If d ¼ x1  x2 , then, d_ ¼ x_1  x_2 ¼ t. Since
t 2 ½0:05; 1, d_ 2 ½0:05; 1. Now, given ðA1 ; A2 Þ ¼ 0:03,
skew at t ¼ 0:12 as 0.02, and assuming the bound on
round-off and truncation errors is 0.001, the transition
guard, x1  x2  0:1 upon instrumentation becomes x1 
x2  ð0:1  0:001  1  ð0:02 þ 0:03ÞÞ ¼ x1  x2  0:049
which prevents the faulty transition at t ¼ 0:12.
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The theorem below formally states that instrumentation
prevents faulty transitions.
Theorem 1. Let the code K of the model D be implemented on a
distributed platform. Let for every agent Aj , p be the current
state with IAj ðpÞ the set of invariants in that state, and GAj ðeÞ
the set of guards. If 8G 2 GAj ðeÞ that evaluate to true, and 8x,
G is instrumented as given in Definition 2 then there will be
no faulty transitions.
Proof (Sketch). The essential idea behind instrumentation is
to reflect the effect of numerical errors and synchronization errors in the generated code to the invariants and
guards of each position. The theorem is proved by
showing that the resulting hybrid automata produce a
sound trace on discrete transition steps. This proof is
accomplished, in turn, by proving each of the following
statements:
1.

[9, Lemma 1] Every run of a system of DCHA has
an equivalent run in the originating system of
hybrid-system automata if in the originating
system the dynamics do not change (insensitive)
in between the sampling interval. The following
definition captures the measure of insensitivity
more formally.

Definition 8 (h-Insensitivity [9, Definition 13]). Given a
communicating hybrid automata A, the invariant Ix ðpÞ
corresponding to a position p and a continuous variable x is
said to be insensitive if every x is such that xðtÞ 2 Ix ðpÞ (i.e., x
R tþh
satisfies its invariant), xðt þ hÞ ¼ xðtÞ þ t Fp ðxÞdt 2
R tþ
Ix ðpÞ implies xðt þ Þ ¼ xðtÞ þ t Fp ðxÞdt 2 Ix ðpÞ for all
2 ½0; h, where F is the derivative of x, and xðtÞ denotes the
valuation of x at time t. When all invariants are h-insensitive,
then the hybrid automata A is said to be h-insensitive. If every
model A is h-insensitive, then we say that the system of
communicating hybrid automata C is h-insensitive.
[9, Theorem 1] Given a communicating hybrid
automata A, and its corresponding instrumented
automata B, assuming that A is hB -insensitive, then
B always produces a safe run, i.e., a run that is
always included in that of A.
2. [9, Theorem 2] Given a system of communicating
hybrid automata C ¼ hðA; SV Þ1 ; . . . ; ðA; SV Þn i and
their corresponding instrumented versions C ¼
hðB; SV Þ1 ; . . . ; ðB; SV Þn i, such that the automata Bj
is hBj insensitive, then, every run of the system of
communicating hybrid automata is included in that
of the originating system.
For a formal treatment of the model, the statements,
and the proofs, we refer the reader to the work by Choi,
Hur, and others [9], [32], [33].
u
t
Notice that in Example 6, the instrumentation reduces
the guard interval substantially. It is possible that with
the shrinking of the guard set, the transition is missed
completely. The next section will analyze and derive a
condition to check for missed transitions and possibly avoid
them by higher sampling.
1.
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3.2 Preventing Missed Transitions
Missed transitions are transitions that are enabled in the
model but not taken in the code. They occur either because
the guard is not evaluated sufficiently or scheduling
affected the order of evaluation.
Definition 9 (Missed Transition). Let p0 ; . . . pn be a sequence
of positions in a terminated trace of the code, i.e., pn ¼? ,
where ? denotes a state that violates the invariant. There is a
missed transition at pn1 , if p0 ; p1 ; . . . ; pn1 is a valid
sequence of positions in the model, but p0 ; p1 ; . . . ; pn is not.
In general, a transition will not be missed, if it stays
enabled long enough to be detected. The theorem below
gives a sufficient condition to prevent missed transitions.
Theorem 2 [10]. Let the code K of the model D be implemented
on a distributed platform, hj be the period of sampling in agent
Aj . Let I be an instrumented invariant in a state and g ¼
V
i xi 2 ½lxi ; uxi ; g  I represent the instrumented guard of a
transition in that state. If lt represents the current logical time
at Aj , xi ðltÞ the current estimate of xi at Aj , and if Txi are
defined as,
8h
i
l x ðltÞ
u x ðltÞ
>
lt þ xi Lk i þ max ; lt þ xiLk i þ min ;
>
>
x
x
>
i
i
<
if ðxi ðltÞ < lxi Þ; x_i > 0; i
Txi ðkÞ ¼ h
u x ðltÞ
l x ðltÞ
>
>
lt þ xi Lk i þ max ; lt þ xi Lk i þ min ;
>
xi
xi
>
:
if ðxi ðltÞ > uxi Þ; x_i < 0;
then, the transition will not be missed if,

!
\ \



Txi ðkÞ   2hj

 i k¼1;2

where min ¼ ’min þ , max ¼ ’max þ  between agents Ai
and Aj , then, the transition will be detected and will not be
missed if they are taken as soon as enabled.
Proof (Sketch). The proof of the theorem is sketched in two
parts. First, a condition on the overlap of guard and
invariant that will allow detection of the enabling of the
transition is derived. Then, given that the guard is of the
V
form g ¼ i xi 2 ½lxi ; uxi , a sufficient condition to meet
this overlap, based on the periods of execution of agents
is presented.
To prove the first statement, consider a task-period
set  ¼ fð i ; hi Þg1  i  n. Each task i is treated as a
periodic task with period hi executing in a distributed
environment. Let the execution time of i be i and this is
scheduled to run every hi time units. Note that i here
includes both execution time and also perhaps communication delay associated. Also, the time used here is in
the reference frame at the processor executing task i .
Therefore, in the worst case, i might be scheduled at
time jhi and a guard might be enabled (in the code,
perhaps on a different processor) immediately after that,
i.e., at time jhi þ , > 0 and be detected only when i
is next scheduled to run which may be as late as
ðj þ 2Þhi  i . Since eager switching is assumed, this
transition will be taken at ðj þ 2Þhi  i . Thus, if a guard is
not enabled at ðj þ 2Þhi  i , it will go undetected and this
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the period of execution is chosen to be 0.12, it can be seen
that the transition will not be missed.
Theorems 1 and 2 give us a sufficient condition to ensure
a relative faithful implementation that is recorded in the
following result:
Fig. 5. Worst case scenario.

will result in a missed transition. Hence, the guard should
stay enabled for at least ððj þ 2Þhi  i Þ  ðkhi þ Þ ¼
2hi  i  time units. Since is arbitrary, to be safe, it
should stay enabled in the code for 2hi time units so that
the transition is not missed. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.
V
Now, consider the guard set g ¼ i xi 2 ½lxi ; uxi . Let the
current logical time be lt and current values of variables at
agent Aj given by xi ðltÞ. Consider the case where xi ðltÞ <
lxi and xi ðltÞ > 0, the argument for the case where xi ðltÞ >
uxi and xi ðltÞ < 0 is similar. Since x_i 2 ½L1xi; L2xi , x_i can
utmost grow as L2xi . The guard on xi , (½lxi ; uxi ) will then
be enabled for the time interval
"
#
lxi  xi ðltÞ
uxi  xi ðltÞ
þ max ; lt þ
þ min ;
T2 ¼ lt þ
L2xi
L2xi
assuming that in the worst case, the notification for
enabling of the guard gets to Aj in time max and the
notification for exiting comes at min . This is true because
xi is continuous and the guards are assumed to be
disjoint in time; otherwise, there could be resets and the
dynamics of xi would be different. Similarly, if x_i grows
as slow as L1xi , then, it will be enabled for the time
interval of
T1 ¼ ½lt þ

lxi  xi ðltÞ
þ
L1xi

max ; lt

þ

uxi  xi ðltÞ
þ
L1xi

min :

Therefore, if T1 \ T2 6¼ ;, then it represents the time
interval for which guard on xi will be enabled. Hence,
considering the time interval for each of the xi s, the time
interval when the guard will definitely be true. From the
above arguments, one can conclude that a condition in
Theorem 2 gives a sufficient condition for preventing
missed transitions, if the transitions are taken as soon as
they are detected.
u
t
The example below illustrates a case where a transition is
missed when the sufficient condition is not met.
Example 7. Consider the case of Example 4. As a quick
check, if the system evolves as fast as 0.5, then
0:48  0:45
0:48  0:3
T2 ¼ð
þ 0:1;
þ 0:05Þ ¼ ð0:16; 0:41Þ:
0:5
0:5
Similarly,
0:48  0:45
0:48  0:3
þ 0:1;
þ 0:05Þ ¼ ð0:167; 0:45Þ:
T1 ¼ ð
0:45
0:45
kT1 \ T2 k ¼ 0:243 6 2ð0:15Þ does not satisfy the sufficient
condition for preventing missed transitions. However, if

Theorem 3. Let the code K of the model D be implemented on a
distributed platform. If in the code for every agent Ai , every
G 2 GAj is dynamically instrumented as per Definition 7, every
guard and the corresponding invariant satisfy the condition of
overlap in Theorem 2, and all variables in K have bounded error,
then, K is a relative faithful implementation of D.
Proof. For code K to have a relative faithful implementation,
it has to meet the two criteria outlined in Definition 5. If K
has bounded error for each variable, then it meets the first
condition in the definition.
Further, if K is implementing a dynamically instrumented model with the bounds as per Definition 7,
there will be no faulty transitions in the model. If the
instrumented model satisfies the conditions of overlap
between the guard and the invariant in Theorem 2, there
will be no missed transitions because of shrunk instrumented guards. This fact, along with the instrumented
transition policy being an urgent transition policy will
ensure that all enabled transitions will be taken.
With no faulty or missed transitions, the code K will
maintain the state of the model D once each transition is
taken. Consider the second condition of Definition 5. If all
updates have been received by the time the guard and
invariants are evaluated, then the implementation will
0
progress into the next state before the model (i.e., qK ¼ qD
of Definition 5). Otherwise, all the updates will arrive
within j ¼ maxi ði; jÞ þ ’ after they have been updated.
If the agent has not been scheduled for that cycle, the
transition will be taken in that cycle itself, and it has
already been scheduled, then the transition will be taken
next time the agent is scheduled to execute.3 In either case,
we have, the time of transition in the code t is such that t <
0
0
: qK
¼ qD of Definition 5.
lti þ j þ ’ þ hj . Therefore, 9qK
From these observations, it follows that K is a relative
faithful implementation of the model D.
u
t
To conclude this section, we would like to add that, the
result on missed transitions is only useful to detect whether
an instrumented guard can still allow for transitions out of a
state. This by itself does not ensure any liveness property of
the system. It is the eager transition policy, i.e., forcing the
code to take the transition as soon as a guard is enabled,
that enforces liveness of the system.

4

CASE STUDY: HEATER MODEL IN CHARON

As a case study to illustrate the framework introduced,
consider the heater benchmark controller as described in [34]
with three rooms and one heater where the three rooms
communicate their temperature to the heater. The temperature of a room depends on other rooms, the outside
3. Note that, the above result assumes that the assumption that at most
one transition is enabled still holds after the guards are instrumented.
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Fig. 6. Hybrid-Systems model for the Room Heater Thermostat.

temperature, and on whether the heater is present in the
room. The heater is controlled by a typical thermostat, i.e., it
is switched on if the temperature is below a certain threshold,
and off if it is beyond a higher threshold. When the
temperature in any room falls below a certain desired level,
it may get a heater, provided the temperature in that room is
significantly higher. The desired objective is to maintain all
the three rooms within the comfortable temperature range. A
heater is moved from room j to room i if 1) room i has no
heater, 2) xi  get, and 3) xj  xi  dif where get and dif are
constants and can differ for each room.
The hybrid-systems model for heater is described in Fig. 6.
In the model, xi is the temperature in each room and ai;j , bi , ci
are control parameters. The heat exchange between rooms i
and j is assumed to be symmetric, i.e., ai;j ¼ aj;i . Each room
has upper and lower thresholds oni and off i , respectively.
The heater controller is simulated as a distributed system.
Each room has a temperature sensor that broadcasts its
temperature according to the schedule. Since the network
communication introduces delays, the current temperature
in Room i is denoted as real temperature xi and the last
temperature which has been reported to the controller as the
used temperature x0i . The error bound is the absolute difference
between xi and x0i .

4.1 Implementation in CHARON
The implementation in CHARON includes the following
parts: the environment with the three rooms, the heater
controller, and the tree schedule. The environment with the
three rooms is modeled as specified in Fig. 6.
Listing 2. Part of the CHARON code for Room 1.
1 mode HeatedMode1(real u, real heatVal) {
write analog real x1;
read analog real x2, x3, h;
diff{dðx1Þ ¼¼ 0:9 x1 þ 0:5 x2 þ 0:4 u þ heatVal}
}
6
mode UnheatedMode1(real u) {
write analog real x1;
read analog real x2, h;
diff{dðx1Þ ¼¼ 0:9 x1 þ 0:5 x2 þ 0:4 u}
11 }
It is a straightforward implementation, and Listing 2
shows the two modes, heated and unheated, of the
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CHARON code for Room 1. The variable u is initialized
with 4, and the variable heatV al is initialized with 6. Rooms
turn the heater off at a temperature of 25.
The heater controller also directly follows from the
specification given in Fig. 6. However, it is important that
the controller does not operate on the real temperature xi but
instead operates on the used temperature x0i . The transceiver
updates the used temperature as it receives new data sent by
the sensors. Listing 3 shows part of the CHARON code for
the heater control. It reads the values x0i represented as
xi_used. The values for the variables thld and dif are
initialized with 10 and 1, respectively.
Listing 3. Part of the CHARON code for the heater control.
mode TopModeHeater (real thld, real dif){
read analog real x1_used, x2_used,x3_used;
write analog real h;
4 ...
trans from default to q1 when true do{h ¼ 1;}
trans from q1 to q2 when ((x2 used < ¼ thld) &&
(x1_used-x2_used)>¼ dif) do {h ¼ 2; . . . }
trans from q1 to q3 when ( (x3_used <¼ thld) &&
9
(x1_used-x3_used)>¼ dif) do {h ¼ 3; . . . }
trans from q2 to q3 when ( (x3_used <¼ thld) &&
(x2_used-x3_used)>¼ dif) do {h=3; . . . }
...}
Finally, the third part is the transceiver. The schedule is
implemented in a round robin fashion, and it assigns x0i ¼ xi
if its xi ’s slot.
Listing 4. Part of the CHARON code for the tree schedule.
mode CommChannel(real sl_len, real thld, real
dif) {
write analog real x1_used, x2_used, x3_used,
dec;
3 read analog real x1, x2, x3, h;
private analog real tclk, clk;
...
trans from default to reset when true
8
do {tclk ¼ clk;dec ¼ 0; }
trans from reset to r1 when
( (tclk < ðclk-slot lenght)) )
do {tclk ¼ clk; x1 used ¼ x1; dec ¼ 0; }
trans from r1 to r2 when
13
((tclk < ðclk-slot length)))
do {tclk ¼ clk;x2 used ¼ x2;}
trans from r2 to reset when
( (tclk < ðclk  slot length)) )
do {tclk ¼ clk; x3 used ¼ x3; dec ¼ 1; }
diff {dðclockÞ ¼¼ 1:0}
...}

4.2 Faulty Transitions and Instrumentation
Listing 4 shows part of the CHARON code for our
implementation of the schedule. The agent reads the real
temperatures xi and writes the used temperature values x0i .
Depending on the switching logic, it updates different values.
Listing 5 describes the detection of faulty transitions in
the system. The listing shows one particular transition
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Fig. 7. Heater simulation.

where the heater moves from Room 1 to Room 2. The
transitions are named q1q2ok and q1q2faulty. The transition
q1q2ok is a valid transition, because the guard condition

10
...

) do {h ¼ 2;. . . }

system takes a transition with the suffix “faulty.”

Listing 6 describes the procedure for instrumenting
guards. For both transitions, the safety margin is added by
shrinking the guard condition. For the threshold value, instr_t
is subtracted, and for the difference, instr_d added. The
simulations are then rerun and the number of times which the
system takes a transition with the suffix “faulty” is counted.

Listing 5. Detecting faulty transitions in the heater.
...
trans q1q2ok from q1 to q2 when (
((x2_used <¼ thld) &&
(x1_used-x2_used)>¼ dif) &&
((x2 <¼ thld) && ðx1  x2Þ >¼ dif))
5
)do {h ¼ 2; . . . }

Listing 6. Guard instrumentation of the heater.
...
trans q1q2ok from q1 to q2 when (
((x2 used <¼ (thld-instr_t)) &&
4 (x1_used-x2_used)>¼ ðdifþinstr d)) &&
((x2 <¼ thld) && ðx1  x2Þ >¼ dif))
) do{h ¼ 2; . . . }

holds on both, the used values x0i and the real values xi . The
transition q1q2faulty is a faulty transition, because the guard
condition holds only for the values x0i but not for the values
xi . The evaluation simply counts the number of times the

trans q1q2faulty from q1 to q2 when (
((x2_used <¼ thld) && (x1_used-x2_used)
>¼ dif) &&
!((x2 <¼ thld) && (x1-x2)>¼ dif))

trans q1q2faulty from q1 to q2 when (
9 ((x2 used <¼ ðthld-instr t)) &&
(x1_used-x2_used)>¼ ðdifþinstr d)) &&
!((x2 <¼ thld) && ðx1  x2Þ >¼ dif))
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5

Fig. 8. Faulty transitions in the heater simulation with uninstrumented
guards.

) do {h=2; . . . }
...

4.3 Evaluation
Fig. 7a shows the results of simulating the hybrid-systems
model with uninstrumented control. The figure consists of
two general parts: the temperature display of the rooms
and the control status. The three top parts show the real
temperature of each room over the time of the simulation.
Each room was initialized with a temperature of 26. With
reference to the model in Fig. 6, the values of get, dif, on,
and off are 15, 2, 25, and 26. The bottom part shows the
status of the heater over the time of the simulation. Only
one heater was used with the condition that it can only
be in one room at any given time. The heater starts off in
Room 1 and it initially stays there, because all rooms are
above the threshold value. Then, it starts switching between
different rooms to heat them as necessary.
However, the uninstrumented control can result in faulty
transitions. The faulty transition typically occurs when the
heater starts heating up one room that is close, but below
the threshold. In the switching condition, the control might
still use a value where the heater is still below the threshold,
while in reality, it is already above the threshold. Fig. 8
shows the number of observed faulty transitions on 10,000
simulation steps.
Once, the guard conditions are instrumented with the
value of 10 for the threshold and the difference, there are no
more faulty transitions (hence, no equivalent to Fig. 8 for
this case). Fig. 7b shows the instrumented version of the
heater control. It clearly shows that in this case the price of a
correct implementation is a tardier control. To our surprise,
the controller never directly heats Room 2. This room, sitting
in between rooms 1 and 3, gets heated indirectly through the
heat transfer (loss) of Room 1 and Room 3. Choosing
different starting conditions cause the heater to move to all
rooms, however, we found this setting to be a more
interesting one, because it demonstrates that faulty transitions can lead to a very different behavior.
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CONCLUSIONS

Hybrid-systems-based design is a promising yet challenging approach for producing reliable embedded software.
Providing formal guarantees is difficult due to the semantic
differences between the model and the code arising as a
result of discretization and communication delays.
This paper has presented an approach to guarantee
faithful switching semantics that involves preventing
missed and faulty transitions. In contrast to related and
prior work, this work has defined a notion of relative faithful
implementation for systems. A runtime instrumentation
technique to prevent faulty transitions has been proposed
and a sufficient condition to prevent missed transitions in
the generated code has been identified. These concepts have
been illustrated via an implementation of a model heater
system. In the future, the focus will be to fully integrating the
infrastructure into the CHARON development environment
and provide comprehensive techniques to detect missed
transitions in the code at runtime.
In conclusion, we discuss some aspects of the techniques
introduced here, and their applicability to large-scale realworld systems. First off, is the issue of scalability. The work
here mainly focuses on preventing faulty transitions and
detecting missed transitions. The main requirement for
instrumentation is the bounds on the errors, which depends
on the system at hand and might be tricky. However,
Instrumentation itself is a fast operation. Checking missed
transitions depends on computing the intersection of sets,
which may be hard for complex sets. This could potentially be
the only performance bottleneck of this framework. However, it must be noted that there exist techniques for efficient
computation of the intersection (see [35]) and the procedure is
performed offline, and therefore, it is only a one-time cost.
The abstractions for platform and code consider only the
basic of all the actual implementation effects and make
several assumptions. These effects can potentially weaken
some of the results presented in this work (e.g., instrumentation bounds). However, we do expect that similar techniques
would be sufficient to handle these aspects of real-world
implementations. The aim of this work is to establish a sound
theory at categorizing some of the implementation effects.
More artifacts of the implementation can be incorporated
into the model as deemed necessary.
Instrumentation can cause tardier control as shown in the
case study. We consider this a positive result as it provides
motivation to study optimization and trade-offs between
incorrect implementation (missed or faulty transitions) and
faster controller response. It is not part of this framework to
characterize this trade-off, since our motivation was to
produce a sound implementation of a given model.
Finally, the faithful implementation criteria introduced in
this work may not be enough to enforce a strict correlation
between the model and its implementation, especially when
one considers the introduced tardiness. There have been a
number of metrics introduced in literature (e.g., [36], [38])
that relate to approximating continuous systems. Currently,
many of these metrics have yet to be fully extended to
hybrid systems. We expect that metrics developed for
hybrid systems could be incorporated into our framework.
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